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Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford 
and the Limits on Substantive 
Criminal Law under Section 7 
Lisa Dufraimont* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of substantive limits on criminal law has been a 
controversial feature of Canadian constitutional law since the advent of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
1
 Section 7 of the Charter 
provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice.” The salience of section 7 for the 
criminal law has always been obvious because criminal law routinely 
operates to deprive people of their liberty through imprisonment. Yet, at 
the time the Charter was adopted, it was generally understood that the 
principles of fundamental justice were merely procedural norms, and that 
section 7 would not empower courts to exercise constitutional oversight 
over the substantive content of criminal laws.
2
 Early on, the Supreme 
Court of Canada rejected this limited interpretation and determined that 
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1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, “The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the Charter” in J. Cameron & 
S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 195, at 196: “[T]he framers of section 7…believed [it] would 
provide only procedural protections for life, liberty and security of the person” [hereinafter “Hogg”]; 
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2014), at 69 
[hereinafter “Stuart”]. 
3  See Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.). Constitutional requirements of fault are among the substantive limits 
on the criminal law imposed by the principles of fundamental justice. 
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Among the substantive principles of fundamental justice that the 
Supreme Court has recognized under section 7 are the three overlapping 







 These principles have been hotly contested in 
two different ways. First, the applicable legal tests and the relationships 
between these principles have often been unclear and subject to frequent 
changes even within the judgments of the Supreme Court. Second, and 
more fundamentally, some criticize these principles on the basis that they 
inappropriately invite courts to evaluate the merits of legislative decisions 
in complex and controversial areas of public policy.
7
 Others, of course, 
welcome the courts’ intervention as a check on irrational, ideologically 
driven legislation.
8
 What is clear is that, by requiring courts to examine the 
purposes and effects of legislative policy choices against broad substantive 
criteria, section 7 norms against arbitrary, overbroad and grossly 




This paper examines the 2013 case of Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Bedford,
10
 in which the Supreme Court restated the law on arbitrariness, 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality, and applied the latter two 
principles to strike down Canada’s prostitution laws. In the first part of 
the paper, I will summarize the Supreme Court’s findings on the section 7 
issues. Next, I will comment on the far-reaching implications of the 
                                                                                                                                  
4  For example, Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, 
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at para. 147 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]. 
5  For example, R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at para. 49 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Heywood”]. 
6  For example R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 
at para. 161 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]. A fourth, related principle that criminal laws 
must not be vague was recognized in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] S.C.J. No. 67, 
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at para. 71 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society”]. 
7  See, e.g., Hogg, supra, note 2, at 209: The cases on arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality cover “some of the most contested political issues in Canada … [and constitute] 
the most dramatic examples of the majoritarian critique of the Charter … that decries the shift of 
policy-making away from the elected, accountable legislative bodies and officials and over to the 
unelected and unaccountable judges”. 
8  See Stuart, supra, note 2, at 140: “s. 7 Charter scrutiny by an independent judiciary … 
has in … [several] highly controversial contexts led to more balanced criminal law tempering the 
rigidity of law and order ideology”; Vanessa MacDonnell, “Developments in Constitutional Law: 
The 2011-2012 Term” (2012) 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) 51, at 55: “section 7 may impose a constitutional 
requirement … of some degree of evidence-based policy-making, at least where those policies 
engage the life, liberty and security of the person of individuals”. 
9  See, e.g., Hogg, supra, note 2, at 209.  
10  [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72, 7 C.R. (7th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bedford SCC”]. 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) LIMITS ON SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 485 
Bedford decision for the law on arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality. Finally, I will consider how the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bedford limits Parliament’s options for the future regulation 
of prostitution. The discussion will demonstrate that Bedford 
significantly advances the law on arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality. The decision clarifies the definitions of these 
principles of fundamental justice, explains their interrelationships, and 
demonstrates that they remain vital and capable of constraining 
legislative choice on contested policy questions. With regard to the future 
regulation of prostitution, I argue that Bedford leaves it open to 
Parliament to criminalize prostitution itself.  
II. BEDFORD: THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 7 
The three applicants in Bedford were current and former prostitutes.
11
 
They brought an application in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
seeking declarations that the three Criminal Code
12
 prohibitions on 
prostitution-related activities — the bawdy house offences,
13
 the offence 
of living on the avails of prostitution
14
 and the prohibition on 
communicating in public for the purpose of prostitution
15
 — were 
unconstitutional. The evidentiary record on the application was 
voluminous, including extensive evidence from prostitutes and experts 
regarding the risks facing prostitutes in their work.
16
 The application 
judge determined that the impugned provisions were unconstitutional 
because they deprived prostitutes of security of the person in a way that 
                                                                                                                                  
11  I acknowledge that many workers in the sex trade identify themselves as “sex workers” 
and not “prostitutes”, but I use the term “prostitute” here and elsewhere in the paper because that is 
the language adopted by the Court.  
12  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Code”]. 
13  A bawdy-house is defined in s. 197(1) of the Code as a place “kept or occupied, or 
resorted to … for the purpose of prostitution or the practice of acts of indecency”. Section 210 lays 
out offences for keeping, being an inmate of, or being found without lawful excuse in a common 
bawdy-house. 
14  The indictable offence of living “wholly or in part on the avails of prostitution of another 
person” is laid out in s. 212(1)(j). 
15  Section 213(1)(c) defines the offence of communicating for the purpose of prostitution, 
which includes stopping or attempting to stop anyone or communicating or attempting to communicate 
with anyone in a public place for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or hiring a prostitute. 
16  For a description of the evidence on the application, see Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at 
para. 15.  
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was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
17
 The 
case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court, which considered 
arguments that the three prohibitions violated section 7 because they 
were arbitrary, overbroad and grossly disproportionate.
18
 
Chief Justice McLachlin delivered the unanimous judgment of the 
Court striking down all three provisions. The Court found that the 
impugned laws all engaged security of the person because they had 
the effect of heightening the risks faced by prostitutes in their work, 
which the Court emphasized was itself a legal activity.
19
 Specifically, the 
bawdy house provision prohibits in-call work, where the client comes to 
the prostitute at a fixed location, which the application judge determined 
was the safest form of prostitution.
20
 The living on the avails provision 
criminalizes supplying a service to a prostitute because she is a 
prostitute, which effectively prevents prostitutes from taking the safety-
enhancing step of hiring a bodyguard, driver or receptionist.
21
 Finally, the 
communicating provision compromises prostitutes’ safety in three ways: 
it prohibits face-to-face communication in public with prospective 
clients, which the application judge found was an “essential tool” for 
street prostitutes to screen clients for intoxication or propensity to 
violence;
22
 it increases prostitutes’ vulnerability by displacing them to 
more isolated areas;
23
 and it prevents prostitutes from setting terms, like 
condom use, in advance.
24
 The Court dismissed arguments that the 
dangers of prostitution were the result of prostitutes’ choice to engage in 
a risky activity.
25
 Security of the person was engaged because all three of 




Turning to the principles of fundamental justice, the Chief Justice 
explained that section 7 is directed at “inherently bad laws … that take 
                                                                                                                                  
17  Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] O.J. No. 4057, 2010 ONSC 4264, 80 C.R. 
(6th) 256 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Bedford ONSC”]. 
18  These arguments were also considered by a five-judge panel of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186,  
91 C.R. (6th) 257 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford OCA”]. 
19  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at paras. 59-60. 
20  See id., at paras. 62-63. Indeed, the Court noted at para. 64 that even resorting to safe 
houses could be prohibited by the bawdy-house provision. 
21  Id., at para. 66. 
22  Id., at para. 69.  
23  Id., at para. 70. 
24  Id., at para. 71. 
25  Id., at paras. 84-89. 
26  Id., at para. 87. 
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away life, liberty or security of the person in a way that runs afoul of our 
basic values”.
27
 These basic values include the norms against 
arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. The Court 
recognized that these three principles overlap and that they all represent 
what Hamish Stewart has labelled “‘failures of instrumental rationality’ 
— the situation where the law is ‘inadequately connected to its objective 
or in some sense goes too far in seeking to attain it’”.
28
 The Court also 
quoted Peter Hogg’s description of a law that runs afoul of these 
principles as “dysfunctional in terms of its own objective”.
29
 
According to McLachlin C.J.C., the norms against arbitrariness, 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality reflect a concern with two 
distinct “evils”.
30
 The first evil, a lack of connection between the rights 
infringement and the purpose of the law, lies at the root of concerns 
about arbitrariness and overbreadth.
31
 The second evil is that of gross 




The Court then elaborated on the individual norms against 
arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. A law is arbitrary, 
the Chief Justice explained, when it places limits on individuals’ section 7 
interests that bear “no connection” to the law’s objective.
33
 Overbreadth, 
on the other hand, occurs when “there is no rational connection between 
the purposes of the law and some, but not all, of its impacts”.
34
 An 
overbroad law is so sweeping that, in some applications, its purposes and 
effects are unrelated; it is “arbitrary in part”.
35
 Arbitrariness and 
overbreadth are distinct principles, but they are related because both rely 
on a finding that there is “no connection between the effects of a law and 
its objective”
36
 with respect to some (for overbreadth) or all (for 
arbitrariness) applications of the law.  
                                                                                                                                  
27  Id., at para. 96. 
28  Id., at para. 107, quoting Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 151 [hereinafter “Stewart, 
Fundamental Justice”].  
29  Bedford SCC, id., at para. 107, quoting Hogg, supra, note 2, at 209. 
30  Bedford SCC, id., at para. 108. 
31  Id. 
32  Id., at para. 109. 
33  Id., at para. 111 (emphasis in original). 
34  Id., at para. 112 (emphasis in original). 
35  Id. (emphasis in original). 
36  Id., at para. 117 (emphasis in original). 
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Gross disproportionality, by contrast, may exist even when the impact 
of the law is related to its objective. The question is whether the effects of 
the law on section 7 rights are so grave that they are grossly 
disproportionate to its purpose. This test will be met in “extreme cases 
where the seriousness of the deprivation is totally out of sync with the 
objective of the measure”
37
 and where, measured against its purpose, the 
law has a “draconian impact … entirely outside the norms accepted in our 
free and democratic society”.
38
 The Court concluded the discussion of 
arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality by emphasizing that 
the relevant comparison in each case is between the rights infringement 
caused by the law on one hand and the objective of the law on the other — 
the effectiveness of the law is not a factor to be considered.
39
  
The Chief Justice then applied these principles to the impugned laws. 
Looking first at the bawdy house provision, the Court considered prior 
cases and the legislative scheme and determined that the purposes of the 
law are not to deter prostitution generally but rather “to combat 
neighbourhood disruption or disorder and to safeguard public health and 
safety”.
40
 Measured against these purposes was the impact on individual 
safety of the bawdy house provision, which criminalizes prostitutes who 
take the simple, safety-enhancing step of moving indoors.
41
 In this context, 
the threshold of gross disproportionality was met.
42
 In the words of the 
Chief Justice, “Parliament has the power to regulate against nuisances, but 
not at the cost of the health, safety and lives of prostitutes.”
43
  
Turning to the living on the avails offence, the Court held that the 
purpose of the prohibition was to target the parasitic and exploitative 
conduct of pimps.
44
 However, the offence was overbroad because it did not 
distinguish between individuals who exploit prostitutes and individuals 
who pursue non-exploitative and potentially safety-enhancing business 
relationships with them, such as legitimate drivers or bodyguards. In this 
way, the offence extended to cover some conduct bearing no connection to 
its underlying purpose of preventing exploitation.
45
 
                                                                                                                                  
37  Id., at para. 120. 
38  Id. 
39  Id., at para. 123. 
40  Id., at para. 132. 
41  Id., at para. 135. 
42  Id., at para. 136. 
43  Id. 
44  Id., at para. 137. 
45  Id., at para. 142. 
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Finally, the Court considered the communicating provision and 
determined that, like the bawdy house provision, its purpose was not to 
deter prostitution generally but to prevent incidents of public nuisance 
associated with prostitution, in this case street prostitution.
46
 In light of 
the application judge’s finding that the ability to screen clients through 
face-to-face communication is essential to the safety of street prostitutes, 
together with the findings that the communicating provision had the 
effects of displacing prostitutes to less secure locations and impeding 
their ability to bargain for safer conditions, the Chief Justice concluded 
that the impact of the communicating provision on the safety of 




The Chief Justice held, in brief reasons, that none of the impugned 
provisions could be saved under section 1. The bawdy house offence in 
section 210 as it relates to prostitution was therefore struck down,
48
 as 
were the offences of living on the avails of prostitution and 
communicating for the purpose of prostitution in sections 212(1)(j) and 




III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECTION 7 ANALYSIS 
Bedford has contributed significantly to the development of the law 
under section 7 of the Charter, particularly with respect to the principles 
of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. In this part of 
the analysis, I will identify and comment on some implications of the 
Bedford decision for the law related to these principles of fundamental 
justice.  
1.  Arbitrariness, Overbreadth and Gross Disproportionality  
Are Vital Principles 
Taking a broad view of the case and its significance within 
Canadian constitutional law, the main message of Bedford is that the 
                                                                                                                                  
46  Id., at para. 147. 
47  Id., at paras. 155-159. 
48  The word “prostitution” was struck from the definition of a “common bawdy-house” for 
the purpose of that offence. 
49  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 169. 
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norms against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality 
are very much alive and capable of placing meaningful limits on 
legislative choices.
50
 Bedford thus accords with the decision two years 
earlier in Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services 
Society,
51
 in which a unanimous Supreme Court found that the federal 
government’s decision not to extend an exemption from the provisions 
of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
52
 to a safe injection facility 
known as Insite was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate.
53
 The 
government’s decision meant that Insite would have to close, even 
though an extensive body of evidence showed that it protected the 
health and safety of injection drug users without any negative impact 
on the surrounding community.
54
 Given that the purpose of the CDSA 
was to protect public health and safety,
55
 the decision not to extend the 
exemption hindered rather than furthered that objective. The Court 
therefore ordered the Minister to grant the exemption.
56
 The PHS case 
was hailed for its potential to limit government’s freedom to make 
decisions and pass legislation supported by ideology rather than 
evidence where individuals’ lives, liberty or security of the person are 
put at risk.
57
 Bedford relies on a similar set of themes, and sends a 
similar message. The case arguably confirms Vanessa MacDonnell’s 




                                                                                                                                  
50  See Stuart, supra, note 2, at 139: “the Court’s applications of these principles to strike 
down all the prostitution-related offences appears to reinvigorate power for courts to strike down 
legislation judges found to be irrational when measured against the legislative objective”. 
51  [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at paras. 129-135 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]. 
52  S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “CDSA”]. 
53  PHS, supra, note 51, at paras. 132-133. 
54  Id., at para. 131. 
55  Id., at para. 110. 
56  Id., at para. 150. 
57  MacDonnell, supra, note 8, at 84: PHS has “potentially significant implications for the 
government’s ability to act on politics rather than facts where individual lives are at stake”; Alana 
Klein, “The Arbitrariness in ‘Arbitrariness’ (And Overbreadth and Gross Disproportionality): 
Principle and Democracy in Section 7 of the Charter” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. 
(2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 377, at 378 [hereinafter “Klein”]: PHS suggests that “section 7 could play 
an important role in ferreting out government policies that affect the most fundamental of rights and 
that are based on ideology or stereotype over evidence”. 
58  MacDonnell, supra, note 8, at 85. 
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2.  Tests for Arbitrariness, Overbreadth and Gross 
Disproportionality Clarified 
Doctrinally, the most obvious contribution Bedford makes to the 
section 7 jurisprudence is to clarify the tests for arbitrariness, overbreadth 
and gross disproportionality. The tests laid out in Bedford may be 
summarized as follows: 
 A law is arbitrary when it limits section 7 rights in a way that bears 
no connection to its objective. 
 A law is overbroad when some, but not all, of the limits it places on 
section 7 rights bear no connection to its objective. 
 A law is grossly disproportionate in extreme cases where the law’s 
impact on section 7 rights is so serious as to be totally out of sync 
with its objective. 
These tests are clearly formulated and have now been endorsed by a 
unanimous Supreme Court. They should provide settled starting point for 
section 7 arguments in future cases.  
Before Bedford, some uncertainty surrounded the applicable 
tests, especially the test for arbitrariness. In Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), the Court split over the test for arbitrariness, with 
McLachlin C.J.C. determining on behalf of three judges that the 
impugned law was arbitrary because it imposed limitations that were 
“unnecessary” to achieve the law’s objectives.
59
 Writing in dissent on 
behalf of three judges, Binnie and LeBel JJ. rejected the idea that a law 
could be “invalidate[d] … simply because a court believes it to be 
‘unnecessary’ for the government’s purpose”.
60
 The dissenting judges 
preferred to insist on stricter compliance with the test for arbitrariness 
laid down in Rodriguez, requiring a law that “bears no relation to, or is 
inconsistent with” its own objective.
61
 For Binnie and LeBel JJ., the shift 
from “inconsistent” to “unnecessary” marked an inappropriate 
broadening of the test for arbitrariness that would invite courts to pass on 
                                                                                                                                  
59  [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at para. 132 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. 
60  Id., at para. 233. The seventh judge, Deschamps J., decided the case on the basis of 
Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR c. C-12, and did not address the section 7 
Charter issues directly. 
61  Rodriguez, supra, note 4, at para. 147, quoted in Chaoulli, supra, note 59, at para. 234. 
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the merits of the legislature’s choice among policy alternatives.
62
 The 3:3 
split in Chaoulli therefore introduced fundamental uncertainty into the 
law on arbitrariness, and this uncertainty persisted for almost a decade. 
In PHS, a unanimous Supreme Court acknowledged this uncertainty but 
declined to resolve it, finding instead that the government decision to 
close the safe injection facility was arbitrary on either definition.
63
 
This uncertainty surrounding the law on arbitrariness has thankfully 
been resolved in Bedford. The Chief Justice explained: 
[T]he root question is whether the law is inherently bad because there is 
no connection, in whole or in part, between its effects and its purpose. 
This standard is not easily met. The evidence may, as in Morgentaler, 
show that the effect actually undermines the objective and is therefore 
“inconsistent” with the objective. Or the evidence may, as in Chaoulli, 
show that there is simply no connection on the facts between the effect 
and the objective, and the effect is therefore “unnecessary”. Regardless 
of how the judge describes this lack of connection, the ultimate 
question remains whether the evidence establishes that the law violates 
basic norms because there is no connection between its effect and its 
purpose. This is a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis, in 
light of the evidence.
64
 
While a test for arbitrariness framed in the language of necessity might 
appear to invite courts to measure legislation against other possible 
legislative schemes, the preceding passage suggests that the word 
“unnecessary” was never meant to open up a free-ranging inquiry into 
the legislature’s policy options.
65
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in 
Bedford did well to distance itself from the ambiguous language of 
necessity and to emphasize instead the presence or absence of a 
connection between a law’s impact on section 7 rights and its purpose. 
Reformulated in this way, the test for arbitrariness remains strict and 
does not invite speculation about whether the legislature might have 
achieved its purpose in some other way. 
Somewhat surprisingly, by distancing itself from the language of 
necessity, the Court also changed the test for overbreadth. Since the 
Supreme Court decided R. v. Heywood in 1994, the test for overbreadth 
has been whether the state’s chosen legislative “means [are] necessary to 
                                                                                                                                  
62  Chaoulli, id., at para. 234: “‘unnecessary’ simply means that the objective could be met 
by other means … [and] is a much broader term that involves a policy choice”. 
63  PHS, supra, note 51, at paras. 129-135. 
64  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 119 (italics in original, underlining added). 
65  This was the concern of Binnie and LeBel JJ. in Chaoulli, supra, note 59, at para. 234.  
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achieve the State objective”.
66
 The test for overbreadth has not attracted 
the same level of controversy as the test for arbitrariness, but the idea 
that a law is unconstitutionally overbroad whenever it goes farther than 
“necessary” to achieve its objective is obviously vulnerable to the same 
criticisms that surrounded the language of necessity in the context of 
arbitrariness. On its face, the Heywood test for overbreadth appears 
relatively easy to meet and seems to permit courts to second-guess 
legislative policy choices.
67
 In Bedford, however, the Court implicitly but 
clearly rejected the Heywood test (with its reliance on the language of 
necessity) and embraced instead a test for overbreadth centred on 
whether some of the law’s effects bear no connection to the legislative 
objective.
68
 Moreover, the Chief Justice specified that she was speaking 
to “both arbitrariness and overbreadth”
69
 when she determined that “the 
root question is whether … there is no connection, in whole or in part, 
between its effects and its purpose”.
70
  
3.  Arbitrariness, Overbreadth and Gross Disproportionality  
Are Distinct 
The relationships among the norms against arbitrariness, overbreadth 
and gross disproportionality have been a matter of long-standing 
controversy and confusion.
71
 The main source of confusion has been the 
Supreme Court of Canada, which has sent conflicting messages about the 
relationships between these principles. A full history of this confusion 
would overwhelm this paper, so a few examples must suffice.  
In the early overbreadth case of Heywood, for instance, a majority of 
the Court explained that “[t]he effect of overbreadth is that in some 
applications the law is arbitrary or disproportionate”.
72
 Building on this 
idea, the majority of the Court in R. v. Clay held that a finding of 
                                                                                                                                  
66  Heywood, supra, note 5, at para. 49. 
67  See Stuart, supra, note 2, at 134 (under Heywood, overbreadth appears to present a 
relatively easy line of challenge for the defence). 
68  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 112 (overbreadth occurs when “there is no rational 
connection between the purposes of the law and some, but not all, of its impacts” (emphasis in 
original)). 
69  Id., at para. 118. 
70  Id., at para. 119 (emphasis in original). 
71  See, e.g., Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 28, at 152. 
72  Heywood, supra, note 5, at para. 49. 
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overbreadth requires a finding of gross disproportionality.
73
 As recently 
as 2012, in its unanimous judgment in R. v. Khawaja, the Court explicitly 




In other recent cases, notably PHS, the Court has treated arbitrariness, 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality as distinct grounds for a section 7 
challenge.
75
 Surveying the law before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bedford, Hamish Stewart catalogued three possible understandings of the 
relationships among these principles of fundamental justice: (1) that 
overbreadth was the overarching principle; (2) that overbreadth was folded 
into arbitrariness and gross disproportionality; and (3) that all three 
principles were distinct and independent.
76
 Stewart noted that each of these 
three conflicting interpretations found some support in the pronouncements 
of the Supreme Court, but favoured the third interpretation (distinctness) as 
the “most plausible view”.
77
 
In its careful and detailed reasons in Bedford, the Supreme Court has 
now clearly adopted the view that the principles are indeed distinct: 
“Although there is significant overlap between these three principles, and 
one law may properly be characterized by more than one of them, 
arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross disproportionality remain three 
distinct principles.”
78
 Now that this basic conceptual issue has been 
resolved, one may expect courts and commentators to spend less time 
analyzing the relationships among these three principles and more time 
analyzing whether any of these basic defects is present in a given case. 
One objection should be anticipated at this point. It might be argued 
that despite its explicit holding that these principles are distinct, the 
                                                                                                                                  
73  [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735, at para. 38 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clay”]: 
“Overbreadth … addresses the potential infringement of fundamental justice where the adverse 
effect of a legislative measure on the individuals subject to its strictures is grossly disproportionate 
to the state interest the legislation seeks to protect.” (emphasis in original). 
74  [2012] S.C.J. No. 69, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 555, at para. 40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”]. 
See also Hamish Stewart, “R. v. Khawaja: At the Limits of Fundamental Justice” in J. Cameron, 
B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 403, at 410: “The Court, though declining 
to resolve the point explicitly, leans to the view that the two concepts are distinct” [hereinafter 
“Stewart, ‘Limits’”]. 
75  PHS, supra, note 51, at paras. 129-135. 
76  Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 28, at 152. A fourth view, that the other 
principles were “integrated under the umbrella of gross disproportionality”, was discussed in 
John McIntyre, “R. v. Nur: The Need for the Supreme Court to Clarify Charter Standards for 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2014) 7 C.R. (7th) 132, at 145 [hereinafter “McIntyre”]. 
77  Stewart, id., at 154. 
78  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 107. 
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Supreme Court in Bedford failed to define arbitrariness, overbreadth and 
gross disproportionality in a way that supports that claim to analytical 
distinctness.
79
 Specifically, one might argue that the Court undermined 
its own holding that arbitrariness and overbreadth are distinct by defining 
them in such a way that they are inseparable.
80
 On this view, Bedford 
sends a confusing message that arbitrariness and overbreadth “are 
distinct yet essentially the same”,
81
 and this confusion should be resolved 
by explicitly merging these principles.
82
  
While the definitions of overbreadth and arbitrariness in Bedford are 
undoubtedly closely aligned, I would argue that it goes too far to suggest 
that they are the same. This objection can be overcome by focusing on 
what it means for a constitutional principle to be distinct. Stewart has 
observed that if the section 7 norms against arbitrariness, overbreadth 
and gross disproportionality are independent, it must be “possible for a 
law to respect any two of them while nonetheless infringing the third”.
83
 
As defined by the Supreme Court in Bedford, the norms against 
arbitrariness and overbreadth meet this test. A law that limits section 7 
rights in a way that bears no connection at all to its objective will be 
arbitrary but not overbroad (because overbreadth applies only when 
“there is no rational connection between the purposes of the law and 
some, but not all, of its impacts”
84
). Conversely, a law that is overbroad 
in the sense that some but not all of the limits it places on section 7 
rights bear no connection to its objective will not be arbitrary (because 
arbitrariness requires a lack of connection between the impact and 
objective in all applications of the law). This analysis reveals that the 
Supreme Court has defined overbreadth and arbitrariness in a way that 
makes these principles not only analytically distinct but also mutually 
exclusive. Defined in this way, no law can be both arbitrary and 
overbroad. 
                                                                                                                                  
79  Such an argument may well underlie Don Stuart’s suggestion that “[g]reater clarity might 
have been achieved by folding the three doctrines under the one heading of arbitrariness”. Stuart, 
supra, note 2, at 138.  
80  See McIntyre, supra, note 76, at 146-47: Bedford “merged these two principles into one 
of arbitrariness, where a law can be invalidated for being either partially or fully arbitrary”. 
81  Id., at 147. 
82  Id. 
83  Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 28, at 152. 
84  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 112 (emphasis in original). 
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4.  Mere Proportionality Not the Issue under Section 7 
The constitutional norms against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality are frequently said to require courts to investigate the 
effectiveness of the challenged legislation.
85
 Relatedly, the section 7 
analysis under these doctrines is often described as involving a general 
proportionality inquiry akin to the Oakes
86
 proportionality test under 
section 1 of the Charter.
87
 The following passage exemplifies this line of 
argument: 
That the Court has coalesced around these three principles is notable, in 
part, because they mirror the analysis conducted under the Oakes test: 
arbitrariness equates with rational connection, overbreadth with minimal 
impairment and gross disproportionality with the proportionality of 
salutary and deleterious effects. In weighing a section 7 deprivation 
using these three principles, which essentially mirror the analysis under 
section 1, the Court also appears to have accepted the necessity of 
engaging in a balancing of societal and individual interests under section 
7 itself, as opposed to doing so exclusively under section 1.
88
 
Certain differences between the section 1 and section 7 analyses are, of 
course, well recognized, in particular the different allocation of burdens 
and the difference in standards implied by the phrase “gross” (as opposed 
to simple) disproportionality.
89
 Nevertheless, some level of scholarly 
support has developed around the idea that section 7 analysis under 
arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality requires courts to 
assess the effectiveness of the legislation of the challenged law in a 
proportionality analysis that is broadly similar to the Oakes test. 
In Bedford, the Supreme Court resisted this line of reasoning almost 
entirely. According to the Supreme Court, the effectiveness of the legislation 
is immaterial to the section 7 analysis under all three principles; the Court is 
                                                                                                                                  
85  See, e.g., Hogg, supra, note 2, at 204: gross disproportionality and overbreadth amount to 
“authority for the Court to undertake a review of the efficacy of the means enacted to achieve a 
legislative objective”; Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 28, at 143: “applying the norm 
against arbitrariness requires … an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of the law or decision 
in achieving those purposes”. 
86  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
87  For example, Klein, supra, note 57, at 392 (describing the s. 7 analysis as a proportionality 
analysis and comparing it to the Oakes test); Stewart, “Limits”, supra, note 74, at 411.  
88  Patrick Monahan & Chanakya Sethi, “Constitutional Cases 2011: An Overview”  
in J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1, at 22. 
89  See, e.g., Klein, supra, note 57, at 392. Under s. 7, the Charter claimant bears the burden 
of establishing the law’s inconsistency with the principles of fundamental justice, while the Crown 
bears the burden to justify rights infringements under s. 1. 
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not called on to balance the good effects of the challenged law against the 
bad; and the section 1 proportionality analysis is distinguishable in kind 
from the analysis required under arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality. Chief Justice McLachlin explained: 
All three principles — arbitrariness, overbreadth, and gross 
disproportionality — compare the rights infringement caused by the law 
with the objective of the law, not with the law’s effectiveness. That is, 
they do not look to how well the law achieves its object, or to how much 
of the population the law benefits. They do not consider ancillary benefits 
to the general population. Furthermore, none of the principles measure 
the percentage of the population that is negatively impacted. The analysis 
is qualitative, not quantitative. The question under s. 7 is whether 
anyone’s life, liberty or security of the person has been denied by a law 
that is inherently bad; a grossly disproportionate, overbroad, or arbitrary 
effect on one person is sufficient to establish a breach of s. 7.
90
 
The Court in Bedford recognized that there are parallels between the 
section 1 analysis and the section 7 analysis of arbitrariness, overbreadth 
and gross disproportionality.
91
 However, McLachlin C.J.C. went on to 
emphasize differences that go beyond the allocation of burdens and the 
different thresholds of gross versus simple disproportionality. The section 7 
analysis is narrower, the Chief Justice explained, and requires the Court to 
take the legislative objective at “face value” and measure it against the 
negative effects of the law on individual rights.
92
 By contrast, the section 1 
analysis centres on “[t]he question of justification on the basis of an 
overarching public goal”,
93
 a matter that “plays no part”
94
 under section 7. 
The Court concluded that section 1 and section 7 are “analytically 
distinct”,
95
 and that the possibility that a government could justify a section 7 
violation under section 1 was real.
96
 
Thus, Bedford indicates that it would be a mistake to equate the section 7 
analysis under arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality 
with a mere proportionality analysis.
97
 A generalized balancing of 
                                                                                                                                  
90  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 123 (emphasis in original). 
91  Id., at para. 124. 
92  Id., at para. 125. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id., at para. 128. 
96  Id., at para. 129. 
97  Admittedly, the Oakes test itself is multi-faceted, and describing it as a “mere” or 
“general” proportionality test is itself an oversimplification. Looking more closely at the steps of the 
Oakes test reveals some features that are closely aligned with the principles of fundamental justice 
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salutary and deleterious effects finds a place in the section 1 analysis, but 
the section 7 analysis is far more focused: the effectiveness of the law, its 
social benefits, and even the quantitative aspect of its negative effects 
(i.e., the number of people it affects negatively) are all immaterial. The 
analysis is confined to measuring the rights infringement flowing from 
the law against the law’s objective. What remains to be seen is whether 
these analytical boundaries so carefully crafted in Bedford will be 
respected in future cases. Given the richness of the evidentiary record 
about general social effects in cases like PHS and Bedford, one suspects 
that courts grappling with issues of arbitrariness, overbreadth or gross 
disproportionality in similar cases might be tempted, despite the 
guidance of the Court, to consider such factors as the challenged law’s 
effectiveness and the number of people it harms and benefits. 
5.  The Section 7 Analysis Leaves Room for Expression of Judicial 
Preferences 
Despite the analytical limits drawn by the Court around the section 7 
analysis, the doctrines of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality inescapably require courts to assess legislative policy 
choices. These doctrines therefore remain open to the charge that the 
results of a constitutional challenge may “[reflect] little more than 
judges’ policy preferences”.
98
 The Court has taken pains in Bedford to 
explain in detail the factors to be weighed within the constitutional 
analysis, so it would seem uncharitable to suggest that judicial 
preferences alone drive results. Nevertheless, certain steps within the 
section 7 analysis leave courts with substantial interpretive freedom, and 
this freedom creates space for the expression of policy preferences. 
Since an analysis under arbitrariness, overbreadth or gross 
disproportionality requires the court to measure the rights-infringing 
impact of the law against its purpose, identifying the law’s purpose is a 
crucial step that largely determines the constitutional claim’s chance of 
success. For instance, in PHS, the Supreme Court defined the purpose of 
the CDSA as protecting public health and safety, which enabled the 
                                                                                                             
under s. 7, such that certain violations of those s. 7 principles probably can’t be justified under s. 1. 
For example, it is difficult to see how a law that is arbitrary in the sense that its impact on rights 
bears no relationship to its objectives could ever be seen rationally connected to its objective, let 
alone minimally impairing of rights. I am indebted to Ben Berger for raising this point. 
98  Klein, supra, note 57, at 384. 
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Court to find that the government’s decision to close the safe injection 
facility ran contrary to the underlying legislative purpose. However, as 
Alana Klein has pointed out, if the Court had defined the purpose of the 
CDSA, quite plausibly, as discouraging illicit drug use, the government’s 
decision might not have seemed so arbitrary.
99
 The definition of the 
legislative purpose played a similar defining role in Bedford. The success 
of the challenge to the prostitution laws depended, in large measure, on 
the Court’s interpretation of the bawdy house and communicating 
provisions as having relatively unimportant, nuisance-related purposes.
100
 
To be fair, the Court in Bedford was not entirely unconstrained in its 
determination of legislative purpose; the Supreme Court had previously 
ruled that these provisions were directed at combatting public 
nuisances.
101
 Still, in declining the Crown’s invitation to take a broader 
view of the legislative purpose,
102
 the Court made a decision that greatly 
enhanced the strength of the constitutional challenge. In sum, judges’ 
interpretive role in determining the purposes of the impugned legislation 




A similar argument can be made regarding judges’ power to interpret 
the meaning and scope of the challenged legislative provision. The section 7 
doctrine of vagueness almost never results in a successful challenge, in 
part because courts use their power to interpret statutes to resolve 
vagueness problems instead of striking down vague enactments.
104
 
Overbreadth problems can be, and frequently are, solved in a similar way: 
instead of striking down an overbroad provision, courts can interpret the 
                                                                                                                                  
99  Id., at 385. 
100  See Janine Benedet, “Bedford: The Pimping Offence Should Have Been Upheld” (2014) 
7 C.R. (7th) 57, at 57 [hereinafter “Benedet”]. 
101  The Court in Bedford relied on the Prostitution Reference (Reference re ss. 193 and 
195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”]) in defining the purpose of the communicating provision, and 
on R. v. Rockert, [1978] S.C.J. No. 27, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.), in identifying the purpose of 
the bawdy-house provision. 
102  The Crown had argued that the provisions aimed at deterring prostitution: Bedford SCC, 
supra, note 10, at paras. 131-132 and 147. 
103  See Klein, supra, note 57, at 387: “courts may strike down, uphold, or craft the meaning 
of legislation through the way in which they cast legislative purpose against which to assess 
arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality”). See also Hogg, supra, note 2, at 203: “a 
judge who disapproves of a law will always be able to find that it is overbroad”. 
104  This “tendency … to reject frontal vagueness attacks by first reading in clarifying 
requirements” (Stuart, supra, note 2, at 128) largely explains why Don Stuart describes vagueness 
doctrine as having “no teeth” (id., at 127).  
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law more narrowly.
105
 Notably, in Bedford, the Court elected not to take 
this approach, even though it was available as a way of saving the 
prohibition on living on the avails of prostitution. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal had recognized that the provision was overbroad because it would 
cover non-exploitative business relationships, but cured the constitutional 
problem by reading in a requirement of “circumstances of exploitation”.
106
 
Without any analysis, the Supreme Court rejected this option and struck 
the provision down. Bedford thus demonstrates that courts retain a 
significant measure of interpretive freedom, which may function as a way 
of expressing judicial attitudes about the merits of challenged legislation. 
IV. LIMITS ON THE FUTURE REGULATION OF PROSTITUTION 
The most controversial question flowing from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bedford is how it will affect the future regulation of 
prostitution in Canada. Since Bedford was released, debate has raged 
about how best to regulate prostitution, and the options discussed have 
ranged from the New Zealand model of full decriminalization to the 
Nordic or Swedish model of criminalizing the purchase, but not the sale, of 
sex.
107
 In June 2014, the Conservative government proposed new 
legislation that, like the Nordic model, would make it an offence to 
                                                                                                                                  
105  For an example of a recent case where the Supreme Court used this approach to 
overcome an overbreadth challenge, see Khawaja, supra, note 74. 
106  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 27, citing Bedford OCA, supra, note 18, at para. 267. See 
also Benedet, supra, note 100, at 57, favouring the Ontario Court of Appeal’s “compromise position”. 
107  On the New Zealand model, see New Zealand, Report of the Prostitution Law Review 
Committee on the Operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 
2008). That report concludes that decriminalizing prostitution in New Zealand “has had little impact 
on the numbers of people working in the sex industry” (id., at 13). Proponents of the Swedish model 
claim that it has reduced the number of women involved in prostitution and the harms associated 
with the sex trade. See, for example, the controversial report by Canadian Conservative M.P. Joy 
Smith, “The Tipping Point: Tackling the Demand for Prostituted/Trafficked Women and Youth” 
(February 2014) online: <http://www.joysmith.ca/assets/the%20tipping%20point%20-%20mp%20joy 
%20smith%20-%20feb%2018%202014.pdf>. The claimed benefits of the Nordic model are contested by 
researchers who point to evidence that, in Sweden, the new regime has resulted in the sex trade 
being displaced, not reduced, and in the trade becoming more violent: see, e.g., Sandra Ka Hon Chu 
& Rebecca Glass, “Sex Work and Law Reform in Canada: Considering Problems with the Nordic 
Model” (2013) 51:1 Alta. L. Rev. 101 [hereinafter “Chu & Glass”]; Susanne Dodillet & Petra 
Östergren, “The Swedish Sex Purchase Act: Claimed Success and Documented Effects” (Paper 
presented at the International Workshop on Decriminalizing Prostitution and Beyond: Practical 
Experiences and Challenges, The Hague, March 3-4, 2011) online: <http://gup.ub.gu.se/records/fulltext/ 
140671.pdf>.  
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purchase sexual services.
108
 The proposed reforms to Canada’s prostitution 
laws are complex: for example, in addition to criminalizing the purchase of 
sex, the new laws would criminalize advertising the sexual services of 
others and communicating for the purpose of selling sex in a public place 
in or near a school ground, playground or daycare.
109
 A full review of  
the proposed legislation goes beyond the scope of this paper, but, as the 
centrepiece of the proposed reforms, the plan to criminalize the purchase 
of sex merits some discussion. This part of the proposed legislation would 
break new ground by directly criminalizing prostitution itself, albeit on an 
“asymmetrical” basis.
110
 It is worthwhile to consider whether such 
criminalization might pass constitutional muster after Bedford. 
Some have argued that any law criminalizing prostitution — even 
one that targets only purchasers — would be unconstitutional.
111
 In my 
view, however, two features of the constitutional analysis in Bedford 
suggest that criminalizing prostitution may be permissible. The first of 
these features is the emphasis in the judgment on the fact that prostitution 
is not currently illegal. It is fair to characterize the lawfulness of 
prostitution as a dominant theme, perhaps the dominant theme, of the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Bedford. The Chief Justice began her 
reasons by observing that “[i]t is not a crime in Canada to sell sex for 
money”
112
 and reaffirmed the lawfulness of prostitution half a dozen 
times throughout the analysis.
113
 In essence, what was objectionable 
about the existing prostitution laws was that they made a “lawful activity 
more dangerous”.
114
 Whether a similar constitutional analysis could be 
sustained in relation to a criminal activity is open to question. It is true 
that on a model of asymmetrical criminalization, selling sex would still 
not be an offence. However, the apparent intent of criminalizing the 
purchase of sex is to outlaw prostitution itself in a way that directs 
                                                                                                                                  
108  Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code in response to the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in Attorney General of Canada v. Bedford and to make consequential amendments 
to other Acts, 2nd Sess., 41st Parl., 2014, cl. 20 [hereinafter “Bill”]. 
109  Id., cls. 20 and 15(3). 
110  The model of criminalizing only the purchase and not the sale of sex has been labelled 
“asymmetrical criminalization”: e.g., Chu & Glass, supra, note 107, at 102. 
111  See id.; Sex Workers United Against Violence et al., My Work Should Not Cost Me My 
Life: The Case Against Criminalizing the Purchase of Sex in Canada (Vancouver: Pivot Legal 
Society, Sex Workers United Against Violence & the Gender and Sexual Health Initiative, 2014) 
online: <http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pivotlegal/pages/615/attachments/original/1401811234/ 
My_Work_Should_Not_Cost_Me_My_Life.pdf?1401811234> [hereinafter “Sex Workers United”].  
112  Bedford SCC, supra, note 10, at para. 1. 
113  Id., at paras. 5, 60, 61, 62, 87 and 89. 
114  Id., at para. 87. 
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enforcement against purchasers. Consequently, to the extent that the 
constitutional analysis in Bedford is based on the legality of prostitution, 
that analysis would apply awkwardly, if at all, to a new law criminalizing 
the purchase of sex.  
The second salient feature of the section 7 analysis is the Court’s 
reasoning about legislative objectives. In the Prostitution Reference, 
Dickson C.J.C. rejected the suggestion that the communicating provision 
aimed “to address the exploitation, degradation and subordination of 
women that are part of the contemporary reality of prostitution”.
115
 By 
contrast, a criminal prohibition on prostitution itself could be directed at 
those very problems, as the preamble to Bill C-36 attests.
116
 These 
exploitation and equality-related objectives would seem considerably 
weightier than the nuisance-related purposes ascribed to the laws struck 
down in Bedford, and for this reason a section 7 challenge to a law 
directed at these new objectives would be considerably more difficult to 
sustain. Adding to the difficulty of challenging a criminal prohibition on 
prostitution on arbitrariness, overbreadth or gross disproportionality 
grounds is the fact that the Court specified in Bedford that the 
effectiveness of the law should not be considered in the section 7 
analysis. One might reasonably object that a law whose purpose was to 
eliminate prostitution would be doomed to failure,
117
 but the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Bedford makes that ineffectiveness constitutionally 
irrelevant under section 7. 
This is not to say that a constitutional challenge to a criminal 
prohibition on prostitution would necessarily fail. Even if the prohibition 
applied only to the purchase and not the sale of sex, there is little doubt 
that such a law would have negative impacts on prostitutes’ section 7 
rights, especially security of the person, by pushing prostitution 
underground into more dangerous social spaces.
118
 The problem is that 
this objection could be levelled against any number of criminal laws, 
such as those prohibiting the sale of illicit drugs. It should be no news to 
anyone that criminalizing activity creates black markets and makes 
participation in those activities more dangerous. Recognizing a section 7 
                                                                                                                                  
115  Supra, note 101, at 1134-35. 
116  The preamble of the Bill, supra, note 108, provides in part: “[T]he Parliament of Canada 
has grave concerns about the exploitation that is inherent in prostitution and the risks of violence 
posed to those who engage in it … [and] recognizes the social harm caused by the objectification of 
the human body and the commodification of sexual activity.” 
117  See, e.g., Sex Workers United, supra, note 111, at 5. 
118  See id., at 6-11; Chu & Glass, supra, note 107. 
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claim against laws with such effects would have potentially far-reaching 
consequences for the criminal law.   
Lest I be misunderstood, I am not advocating for a criminal 
prohibition on prostitution. I think prostitution should be regulated in 
whatever way will be most conducive to protecting vulnerable people, 
especially marginalized women, from exploitation and violence. There is 
considerable debate and, I would argue, real uncertainty about what 
regulatory regime would best accomplish that goal. My purpose in this 
part of the analysis has been to illuminate what I see as an opening, 
created by the Court’s reasoning in Bedford, to “solve” the constitutional 
problem with prostitution laws by criminalizing prostitution itself. The 
existence of that opening suggests that while the section 7 doctrines of 
arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality impose some real 
limits on legislative choice, they leave significant room for Parliament to 
manoeuvre in regulating prostitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Bedford is clearly a landmark case, both in terms of the public 
importance of the prostitution-related issues and from the point of view 
of the development of Canadian constitutional law more broadly. Given 
the highly charged nature of the issues, it is remarkable that the Court 
was unanimous in striking down all of the criminal prohibitions related 
to prostitution. Parliament has already begun the process of framing a 
legislative response to Bedford, and a new round of constitutional 
litigation can be expected in the coming years. While section 7 precludes 
certain legislative strategies, Bedford gives reason to think that 
Parliament retains some choice among a range of options for the future 
regulation of prostitution.  
On the broader question of the section 7 principles of fundamental 
justice against arbitrariness, overbreadth or gross disproportionality, 
Bedford has contributed to the development of the law in a number of 
significant ways. It has clarified the applicable legal tests and the nature 
of the relationships among these norms. Most importantly, it has shown 
that the section 7 substantive limits on the criminal law can impose 
meaningful constraints on legislative choice. 
 
 
